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Abstract
This Article describes the concerns of the European Commission’s Competition Department
about joint ventures for research and development and the problems caused for businessmen by the
Commission’s practice of exempting rather than clearing agreements that make the market more
competitive. National courts may follow the Commission’s practice in relation to Article 85(1),
and they have no power to exempt. Consequently, ancillary restrictions on conduct that make it
worthwhile for a party to contribute to a joint venture may not be enforceable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty' prohibits as incompatible
with the Common Market agreements that may affect trade between Member States and which have the object or effect of
restricting competition within the Common Market. Article
85(3) provides for exemption from this prohibition when collaboration leads to improvements in production or distribution
or promotes technical or economic progress. Exemptions can
be granted only by the Commission of the European Communities. 2 Agreements that infringe the article as a whole are
void and unenforceable in respect of the provisions that restrict competition.3
Businessmen and politicians tend to believe that any collaboration to innovate must either be neutral or increase competition. They are surprised that exemption should be required. If the collaboration is unsuccessful, the market will
punish the participants for wasting resources and there is no
need for intervention on grounds of competition. Alternatively, if the venture is successful, the new technology will compete with the old, the firms enjoying the benefit of the results
will be able to compete better in world markets, and costs and
prices will fall or consumers benefit from better products.
The Commission accepts that in markets where there are
many suppliers or which lack barriers to entry, joint ventures
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
85, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty or Treaty].
2. Under article 9(1) of Regulation No. 17, the first regulation implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, only the Commission can grant individual exemptions. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(1), 13 J.O. 204 (1962), 0.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 87 [hereinafter Council Regulation No. 17]. Different regulations
apply to transport, but again, national courts are not allowed to grant exemptions. In
Council Regulation No. 19/65, 36J.O. 533 (1965), 0J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-66, at
35 and Council Regulation No. 2821/71,J.O. L 285/46 (1971), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1971, at 1032, the Council of Ministers empowered the Commission also to grant
exemptions to specified categories of agreements. In Commission Regulation No.
418/85, 0J. L 53/5 (1985), on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements, the Commission exercised the
power granted by Council Regulation No. 2821/71.
3. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(2); Soci~t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357 (interpreting Article 85(2)).
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are unlikely to restrict competition. Even if the venturers are
unlikely to compete with their venture, other firms can.
Where markets are concentrated, it may be argued on the
one hand that the joint venturers are unlikely to compete with
each other or with their joint venture and that the number of
possible suppliers is reduced. Moreover, the parties may accept ancillary restrictions on their conduct. On the other
hand, if not more than one of the parties would have been able
to achieve on its own the task of the joint venture, and if the
ancillary restraints are required to make the venture viable, the
market may be more competitive than it would have been without the joint effort. Not more than one party would have been
able to enter the market independently of the other(s) and,
possibly, the joint venture will have provided a competitive
force more effectively than any one of the parties could have
done alone.
Until recently, the Commission has habitually appraised
the need to amalgamate complementary resources and accept
ancillary restrictions when markets are concentrated only when
granting an exemption under Article 85(3), and not when deciding whether Article 85(1) is infringed. The Commission has
tended to stress the negative aspects of such collaboration in
those industries where few firms are capable of substantial research efforts.4 Until 1990, in formal decisions, joint ventures
4. There is, however, movement towards the view that ancillary restraints required to make viable a transaction that is not, in itself, anti-competitive do not infringe Article 85(1), so need no exemption. This view has been applied by the Court
in cases not concerned with joint ventures, such as Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v.
Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R. 414. It now seems to be fashionable to refer to this as the "inherency"
doctrine, which is based on German cartel law. The Commission decisions in Elopak/
Metal Box-Odin and Konsortium ECR 900, where joint ventures were at last cleared
and not exempted, will be discussed at part V below.
In relation to joint ventures, see, for example, Jonathan Faull,JointVentures Under
the EEC Competition Rules, 5 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 358, 364 n. 10 (1984), where he
refers to the U.S. doctrine of ancillary restraints, and Eric White,Joint Ventures Under
EEC Competition Law, 16 Ir'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 663 (1985).
The Commission has also accepted that joint ventures between competitors do
not restrict competition appreciably and, consequently, do not infringe Article 85(1)
where their market shares are not too great, and may be exempted if they are. See
infra part V.C.

A third way in which the Commission has cleared joint ventures recently has
been to treat them as concentrative and subject only to Article 86 and Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990)
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have been found to infringe Article 85(1), although almost all
have been exempted.
From the point of view of forming precedents, there is a
crucial difference between, on the one hand, the view that collaboration restricts competition and must be exempted and, on
the other, finding that it does not restrict competition and
clearing the agreement. Only the Commission has power to
exempt, and if a national court asked to enforce an agreement
believes that it infringes Article 85(1), the most it can do is
adjourn for the Commission to grant exemption.' From the
point of view of the parties, too, the difference is crucial. An
agreement that is cleared cannot be attacked for infringing the
EEC competition rules, unless the notification was false or conditions have changed. An exemption can be given for only a
limited period, and may be subject to conditions or obligations.
This Article describes the concerns of the Commission's
Competition Department about joint ventures for research and
development ("R & D") and the problems caused for businessmen by the Commission's practice of exempting rather than
clearing agreements that make the market more competitive.
National courts may follow the Commission's practice in relation to Article 85(1), and they have no power to exempt. Consequently, ancillary restrictions on conduct that make it worthwhile for a party to contribute to a joint venture may not be
enforceable.
Usually joint venturers commit themselves to making investments from the results of which each must be able to profit
without the fear that the other parties or outsiders will reap
more than they have sown. Otherwise, venturers are unlikely
to invest. Even joint ventures for R & D may not lead to intellectual property rights, so usually they include contractual
terms ensuring that only the parties will be able to enjoy the
[hereinafter Merger Regulation]. See infra part VI; see also James S. Venit, Oedipus Rex:
Recent Developments in the Structural Approach to Joint Ventures Under EEC Competition Law,
WORLD COMPETITION, Mar. 1991, at 5, 8-9, 15-20, 28-29.
Nevertheless, the movement towards clearance is hesitant and inconsistent. In
three recent decisions, discussed infra part V.D, the Commission has exempted under
Article 85(3) joint ventures that, in my view, it should have cleared as not restricting
competition.
5. See infra parts I.C, I.D.3.
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results. Where the parties want the results for the same purpose, they are likely to need to ensure also that some do not
exploit the ideas to the degree that there is insufficient demand
left for the others to satisfy. They may also need to ensure that
the results are in fact used and that the others do not carry on
independent research that might compete with that of the joint
venture.
Valid contractual provisions to enforce ancillary restrictions on conduct are vital in inducing joint ventures that may
lead to innovation. Since the Commission lacks the resources
to grant more than a very few individual exemptions each year,
it is very important that agreements should not unnecessarily
be treated as infringing Article 85(1), with the consequence
that some provisions in the agreement would be void.
Very recently, the Commission has been clearing some
joint ventures as not infringing Article 85(1) rather than exempting them. This is a most important development, discussed at parts V and VI below, and one which may lead to
such agreements being more easily enforceable in the courts.
B. Importance and Difficulty of Analyzing ex ante
Perceived ex post, after the investment has been made and
the results have been achieved, these ancillary restrictions are
clearly anti-competitive. Once the results have been obtained
it would be more competitive if the parties were free to compete with each other.
Perceived ex ante, however, at the time the parties were deciding whether to commit themselves to investment in R & D,
the restrictions may be pro-competitive, if without them, or
something like them, the parties would not have made the investment. One should compare the position that has resulted
from the collaboration with that which would have occurred
6
without it.

6. See Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Etablissements Consten SARL and
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R.
299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418. The Advocate General stated that:
[p]roperly understood, therefore, Article 85(1) requires a comparison between two market situations: that which arises after the making of an agreement and that which would have arisen had there been no agreement. This
concrete examination may show that it is not possible for a manufacturer to
find an outlet in a particular part of the market unless he concentrates sup-
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To decide whether the ancillary restrictions are pro- or

anti-competitive is difficult. It may be hard to demonstrate
that the parties would not have made their investment without
the ancillary restrictions on conduct. Where the restrictions
are not limited to the use of the results they make possible, it
may be hard to establish that the results of the collaboration
are more important than the restrictions.
It is hardly surprising that officials of the Commission,
most of whom are jurists with little knowledge of
microeconomics or experience in industry, should have tended
to appraise agreements ex post when applying Article 85(1).
They have exempted ancillary restraints on conduct under Article 85(3) when they are reasonable and necessary to induce
the investments. The decisions appear contradictory, in that
the very provision found to restrict competition within the
meaning of Article 85(1) is exempted on the basis that it makes
competitive conduct possible.
This practice of analyzing agreements ex post and finding
that significant restrictions of conduct restricted competition
and required exemption had the advantage that the difficult
decisions were centralized in the Commission, which had a
very wide discretion to grant exemptions. This was politically
expedient, because the two Member States that had a national
competition law in the 1960s had very different attitudes.7 The
ply in the hands of a sole concessionnaire. That would signify that in a given
situation an exclusive distributorship agreement has effects which are likely
only to promote competition. Such a situation can in particular appear when
what is at issue is gaining access to an[d] penetrating a market.
Id. at 358-59, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 431-32 (emphasis in original).
The Court followed his example in Socie' Technique Miniire, [1966] E.C.R. at 250,
[1966] C.M.L.R. at 368-70, and in NV L'Oreal and SA L'Oreal v. PVBA De Nieuwe
AMCK, Case 31/80, [1980] E.C.R. 3775, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235. In L'Orial, the
Court stated that
in order to decide whether an agreement is to be considered as prohibited
by reason of the distortion of competition which is its object or its effect, it is
necessary to consider the competition within the actual context in which it
would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute. To that end, it is
appropriate to take into account in particular the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the position
and the importance of the parties on the market for the products concerned,
and the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of agreements.
Id. at 3792, (1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 253.
7. The French law was harsh on vertical agreements, perceived as supporting
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practice of interpreting Article 85(1) widely had the grave disadvantage, however, that the Commission lacked the resources
to grant many exemptions, and has never managed more than
ten exemptions under Article 85(3) in a single year.
C. Invalidity
Since, by virtue of Article 85(2), agreements that infringe
Article 85 are void in respect of the provisions that restrict
competition, the practice of exempting rather than clearing
agreements causes difficulty when the parties try to enforce
their agreements. Since SA Brasserie de Haecht v. the spouses Wilkin-Janssen,8 it has been clear that notification to the Commission with a request for exemption does not confer provisional
validity on an agreement.' Only a formal exemption, which is
binding on the parties to whom it is addressed, binds a national court. If a national court is persuaded that an agreement does not require exemption because it does not restrict
competition or does not affect trade between Member States,
the court cannot refuse to enforce its restrictive provisions by
virtue of Article 85(2). A national court, however, has no
power to grant an exemption, and it is widely thought that the
enforcement by a national court of a contract that infringes Article 85(1) would amount to exempting it.' 0
In an action to enforce restrictive provisions of ajoint venture agreement, or for damages for their breach, a national
court might have to adjourn to enable the Commission to decide whether to exempt the agreement, and the defendant to
the action would then be in a position to help the Commission
the "black market." The German law was harsher on horizontal agreements, which
might be naked cartels intended to restrict production and raise prices without supporting any pro-competitive activity.
8. Case 48/72, [1973] E.C.R. 77, [1973] C.M.L.R. 287.
9. Agreements made before Regulation No. 17 came into force and some other
agreements do enjoy provisional validity if they were notified to the Commission in
due time.
10. But see Alexis de Nore and his wife Martine, n6e de Clercq v. NV Brouwerij
Concordia, Case 47/76, [1977] E.C.R. 65, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 378, where the Commission stressed the importance of legal certainty and argued that a national court
should be able to enforce an agreement where it was clear from the Commission's
past practice that it would not condemn the agreement. Id. at 82, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 398. The Court never dealt with the issue. See infra part I.D.3 and note 23.
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find anti-competitive effects. This legal uncertainty must have
a chilling effect on joint ventures.
D. Possible Ways of Dealing with the Commission's Case Load
1. Formal Exemptions
The Commission has power to exempt agreements individually, provided that the agreements have been notified to
it." It has selected carefully the files that it has pursued to a
formal decision, and gives priority to those that may establish
new points, or deal with matters which it intends to exempt by
regulation. Some priority is given to those that are the subject
of litigation in a Member State.
Until 1990, all the formal decisions relating to joint ventures were exemptions. Problems arise when enforcing agreements that have not been the subject of formal decisions, or
when the Commission requires alterations to be made to the
2
contract after one party has performed more than the other.'
The parties to an agreement with respect to which the Commission intends to adopt a formal decision may prefer an exemption to a negative clearance, since an exemption binds the
parties to whom it is addressed,' 3 while the terms of a negative
clearance are very limited.' 4 On the other hand, an exemption
lasts only for a limited period and may be subject to conditions
or obligations. Literally, a negative clearance cannot be subject
to conditions, although the Commission may be prepared to
adopt one only after the parties have "voluntarily" altered
their agreement.
The greater problem is that national courts, which have no
11. This notification must be provided on form A or B, in accordance with Commission Regulation No. 27/62, 35J.O. 1118 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at
132, as amended by Commission Regulation No. 2526/85, Oj. L 240/1 (1985). This
is a troublesome operation requiring management time to explain the structure of
the market and the advantages of the agreement, as well as specialized and costly
legal advice.
12. See infra part III.
13. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169.
14. Council Regulation No. 17, article 2, provides that "the Commission may
certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under
Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision or practice." Council Regulation No. 17, supra note 2, art. 2, OJ.
Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88.
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power to exempt, may follow the Commission's precedents on
the application of Article 85(1).
2. Formal Exemptions in Short Form
In BP/Kellogg,l 5 the Commission adopted its first short
form exemption. One of the difficulties in adopting exemptions is that the Commission has to publish two items in the
Official Journal, requiring translations into all the Community
languages.' 6 Under article 19(3) of Regulation No. 17, the
Commission is required to publish its intention to take a favourable decision, and under article 21 it is required to publish
the actual decision. In BP/Kellogg, the Commission stated the
facts and the arguments of the parties in the first notice, and
repeated them literally as the basis of its decision, adding less
than one column of text stating the reasons for its exemption
by reference to the arguments of the parties. The whole was
published in less than three full pages of the Official Journal.17
The drawback of this procedure is that the reasons are
very short. Article 190 of the Treaty requires the Commission
to give reasons for its formal acts. It is doubtful whether the
reasoning to support the finding that Article 85(1) was infringed was sufficient to satisfy Article 190, although the Court
ofJustice has not required very detailed reasons. Probably, the
reasoning in BP/Kellogg was just sufficient to support the exemption. The validity of short form exemptions has not been
tested in the Court and doubts of this kind have led to the
Commission granting very few exemptions in short form.
3. Informal Comfort Letters
Most of the requests for exemption with which the Commission deals are closed informally with a "comfort letter."
Even where markets are concentrated, some letters state that
15. O.J. L 369/6 (1985), [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 619.
16. There are now nine Community languages: Danish, Dutch, English, French,
German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish, as well as Erse, on translation into
which the Irish do not insist. The problem will become so bad if the three Nordic
countries and some of the East European countries and Turkey accede, that it may
become possible for Member States to agree on only a few languages at least for
some purposes.
17. The notice under article 19(3) was published in OJ. C 224/2 (1985). The
formal parts of such decisions are identical, so hardly any translation is needed.
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the agreement does not infringe Article 85(1) because not
more than one of the parties could have achieved the task of
the joint venture on its own, 18 and the restrictions of competition accepted are the minimum that were necessary to induce
each party to collaborate. In private conversations and in

speeches, Commission officials often state that where markets
are not concentrated, Article 85(1) is not infringed,' 9 but few
of these comfort letters have been published.
Letters stating that the agreement is not prohibited by Article 85(1) are of some help when enforcing the agreement in a
national court, although they are not binding on national
courts. 20 Many such letters are written. 2 ' Another kind of
18. In Optical Fibres, OJ. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813, Coming Glass could have manufactured the fibres
without collaborating with BICC or Siemens, yet at paragraph 46, the Commission
stated that no one of the joint ventures would have infringed Article 85(1) on its own.
Id. at 36, 46, [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 11,898; see
Valentine Korah, Critical Comments on the Commission's Recent Decisions Exempting Joint
Ventures to Exploit Research That Needs Further Development, 12 EUR. L. REV. 18, 22-39
(1987) (discussing Optical Fibres).
Sometimes there are several firms, any one of which is capable of attempting the
task that they agree to undertake jointly. Where, however, the demand is limited, it
may be that once one of them enters the market the others would refrain from following it, as they would not expect the investment to be profitable. In that situation, the
joint venture does not reduce the number of potential competitors.
19. Mr. Jonathan Faull comes close to saying it in print. Faull, supra note 4, at
361. In GEC-Siemens/Plessey, O.J. C 239/2 (1990), discussed infra part V.C, in the
light of various circumstances affecting the structure of the market, the Commission
accepted that a joint venture between competitors did not infringe Article 85(1)
when the aggregate market shares of the parties were not excessive. The thresholds,
however, are not specified.
20. Procureur de la R~publique v. Bruno Giry and Gubrlain S.A., Joined Cases
253/78 & 1-3/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2327, 2374, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 99, 135 [hereinafter
The Perfume Cases].
In NV L'Oreal and SA L'Or6al v. PVBA De Nieuwe AMCK, Case 31/80, [1980]
E.C.R. 3775, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, Advocate General Rieschl suggested that administrative letters have some sort of binding effect on the Commission:
Indeed, it must be accepted-in this regard L'Or6al is certainly right-that,
having regard to the principle that legitimate expectation must be upheld,
the Commission may depart from the judgment arrived at by its officers only
if the factual circumstances change or if its finding was reached on the basis
of incorrect information.
Id. at 3803, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 246. The Court ruled only that the administrative
letter might be taken into account by the national court but was not binding on it. It
did not consider the effect of the letter on the Commission. Id. at 3789-90, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. at 251-52.
21. Faull, supra note 4, at 359. He said much the same thing in a speech at a
conference organised by European Study Conferences [hereinafter ESC] in Brussels
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comfort letter is less helpful. One stating that, for similar reasons, the agreement merits exemption may imply that the
agreement is contrary to Article 85(1), since otherwise, it
would need no exemption.22
Some of the comfort letters now being sent do not indicate why the Commission is closing the file, and it is not clear
how a national court should apply them. They clearly do not
amount to valid exemptions. Some people argue on the basis
of the Commission's central role in the exemption process that
a national court should enforce such agreements.23
4. Group Exemptions
The Commission has tried to solve the problem of invalidity by granting group exemptions. It was given power by
Council Regulation Nos. 19/65 and 2821/7124 to grant group
exemptions for various categories of agreements. It has exercised this power in relation to joint ventures for R & D in Regulation No. 418/85.5 The Commission has been very cautious,
and few agreements can be brought within the terms of the
regulation. 6
Since 1984, when granting group exemptions, the Commission has often provided an opposition procedure under
in November 1988. Jonathan Faull, Address at the ESC in Brussels (Nov. 1988). In
most years, some 200 to 500 files
are closed without a formal decision. One can check
the figures in the annual reports on competition policy.
22. See, e.g., Mario Siragusa, Notifications of Agreements in the EEC: To Notify or Not
to Notify, 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 243, 246-86 (Barry Hawk ed., 1987). He
observes that the Commission does not see such letters as closing the file. A possibility of exemption remains. Orally, he has described such letters as "discomfort letters."
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
In Delimitis v. Henninger Briu AG, Case C-234/89 (Eur. Ct. J. Feb. 28, 1991)
(not yet reported), Advocate General Van Gerven stressed the central role of the
Commission in granting both group and individual exemptions. The Court stressed
how seldom an exclusive purchasing agreement infringes Article 85(1) and, at paragraph 53, suggested that the Commission might help national courts to apply Article
85(1) by advising the national judge. Id. slip op. 53. The Commission is currently
preparing a notice on the application of Article 85 by national courts.
24. Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O. 533 (1965), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 196566, at 35; Council Regulation No. 2821/71, J.O. L 285/46 (1971), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1971, at 1032. There are also powers now being exercised by the Commission to
grant group exemptions for particular sectors of the economy, such as sea and air
transport and insurance.

25. O.J. L 53/5 (1985).
26. See infra part IV.
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which if an agreement is of the kind exempted by the particular
regulation and notified to the Commission, it will be exempt
under the regulation even if it contains a clause that is not expressly exempted, provided that the Commission does not oppose the exemption within six months. The opposition procedure has not proved very successful in reducing the Commission's case load because the conditions for its application are
tightly circumscribed. To come within the group exemption
for R & D, for instance, the agreement must qualify under article 1, satisfy the conditions of articles 2 and 3, and contain no
provisions "black-listed" by article 6.27 We will see that most
of the agreements that require exemption encourage investment by including black-listed clauses allocating customers,
territories or the quantities that each party may supply. Consequently, the regulation rarely, if ever, applies.
5. Construe Article 85(1) More Narrowly
The paucity of formal decisions of exemption, the lack of
legal effect attributable to informal ways of closing files, and
the narrowness of the group exemption have created great difficulty for firms contemplating joint ventures to create new
technology.
Some officials in positions of influence have always
thought ex ante and seen the need for enforceable contracts.
They have been prepared to write comfort letters stating that
the agreement does not infringe the prohibition of Article
85(1).28 Others have thought ex post under Article 85(1) and
analyzed flexibly only under Article 85(3). The Commission
still seems to clear one agreement and exempt another, when
it is difficult to see how many of those exempted can have restricted any competition that was possible.2 9
In 1968, the Commission tried to facilitate collaboration
in R & D. It issued a notice on co-operation agreements, in
which it suggested that "agreements having as their sole object: (a) the joint implementation of research and development
projects, (b) the joint placing of research and development
27. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, O.J. L 53/5, at 7, 8, 10
(1985).
28. E.g., Faull, supra note 4, at 359.
29. See cases cited infra part V.D.
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contracts, [and] (c) the sharing out of research and development projects among participating enterprises" do not restrict
competition contrary to Article 85(1), provided that the parties
do not agree to limit their own R & D activities, or their right
to use the results of the joint results.3 0
The notice was very limited and of little use when the parties hoped to use the results for the same purpose, since it did
not include agreements where the parties allocated the market
in any way or where the joint venture was to produce 3 ' or distribute the products resulting from the collaboration, nor
when there was any element of exclusivity. Nevertheless, the
Commission did acknowledge that even in concentrated markets some joint ventures might not infringe Article 85(1) and
did not require exemption.
As stated at part I.B above, where, viewed ex ante, not
more than one of the parties could have undertaken the task of
the joint venture independently, and ancillary restraints were
necessary to induce the innovation, they may well have made
the market more competitive and are unlikely to have made it
less competitive. It is vital, if firms in Europe are to keep up
with the Americans and Japanese, that ancillary restraints be
enforceable and that the parties can be advised, at the time
they are negotiating their joint venture and deciding to invest,
that such restraints will be enforceable. The four decisions
adopted recently, 2 stating that joint venture agreements with
30. Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices Concerning Cooperation Between Enterprises, § II(3)(a), J.O. C 75/3 (1968), corrected in J.O. C 84/
14 (1968). The Commission qualified this statement by adding that specialization
agreements may restrict competition if each party may end up holding blocking
rights, unless they agree to give access to the others.
31. The Commission decided that the agreement in Beecham/Parke Davis, OJ.
L 70/11 (1979), [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 157, failed to qualify for clearance under these
tests, probably because the collaboration extended to production as well as to research and development [hereinafter R & D1. It granted an individual exemption
because, in effect, the agreement increased competition.
32. These are Elopak/Metal Box-Odin, OJ. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 832 [hereinafter Odin]; Konsortium ECR 900, OJ. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082, discussed infra part V.A.6; GEC-Siemens/
Plessey, O.J. C 239/2 (1990), where the Commission stated that even joint ventures

between competitors do not infringe Article 85(1) unless their aggregate market
share is substantial, discussed infra part V.C; and Metaleurop SA, O.J. L 179/41
(1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 222, discussed infra part V.B, where a concentrative joint
venture was appraised only under Article 86.
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exclusive provisions do not restrict competition are, therefore,
warmly welcome.
II. THE COMMISSION'S CONCERNS ABOUT JOINT
VENTURES THAT MAY RESTRICT COMPETITION
The Court of Justice has not yet been called upon to consider the merits of any of the decisions on joint ventures,
largely because few such agreements have been condemned,
although some have been exempted for a period subject to
conditions and obligations. Indeed, the Commission has been
criticised for being too permissive under Article 85(3). It is
difficult to assess this criticism, as insufficient market analysis is
published in the decisions.
A. Inherent Effect: Loss of Potential Competition
The Commission may rightly be concerned by a reduction
in the number of competitors when markets are concentrated.33 One or more actual or potential competitors may be
replaced by the joint venture. The Commission's published
decisions mostly have related to concentrated markets, and
have been concerned with collaboration to develop sophisticated technology.
Whether or not the joint venturers agree not to compete
with their joint venture, the Commission's main concern until
the early 1980s was that parties having a substantial equity interest would be deterred from competing with their joint venture regardless of whether they were already in the market or
were merely potential competitors. Parties were found to be
potential competitors even when the Commission recognized
that there was no likelihood of their entering or remaining in
the market independently.3 4
33. Mr. Faull says that "[joint ventures] between competitors with low market
shares are de minimis if there are no other restrictions." Faull, supra note 4, at 363.
See GEC-Siemens/Plessey, OJ. C 239/2 (1990); infra part V.C (discussing GECSiemens/Plessey).

34.
Vacuum
latter in
(4th ed.
cided to
success.

See, e.g., Beecham/Parke Davis, O.J. L 70/11 (1979), [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 157;
Interrupters, O.J. L 48/32 (1977), [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. D67. I criticized the
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 198-99
1990). In both decisions, the Commission accepted that the parties had degive up research in the area because of its high cost and the small chance of
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Nevertheless, few joint ventures have been prohibited.
The Commission usually has been impressed by the efficiencies made possible by collaboration, often between firms with
complementary resources, and it has granted individual exemptions under Article 85(3). It is, however, often difficult to
see how competition was restricted contrary to Article 85(1).
If it were not, it would have been better to clear the collaboration on that ground.
The closer to the market that the joint venture extends,
the more likely it used to be that the Commission would find
that Article 85(1) will be infringed. Where a joint venture is
confined to basic R & D, there may be no relevant product
market in which competition could be restricted.3 5 This will
not be true of a production joint venture, although if each of
the parties distributes the product independently of the joint
venture considerable competition between them may remain.
A joint venture that extends to distribution used to be exempted only if there was good reason for joint distribution, 6
but if the joint venture had appreciable effects on the market, it
was unlikely to be cleared. 7
B. The Group Effect: Spill-Over
In several decisions, the Commission has been concerned
that once the parties find that collaboration is helpful, they
may cease to compete aggressively with each other in other
markets. In WANO/Schwarzpulver, for instance, the Commission was concerned that the parties to a joint venture for black
powder also had interests in explosives, explosives accessories
and safety fuses. 3 8 The joint venture would give "opportuni35. Faull, supra note 4, at 366. Also see the discussion of Commission Regula-

tion No. 418/85, recital 2,OJ.L 53/5 (1985), infra part IV.A.
36. This was done in De Laval/Stork, O.J. L 215/11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R.
D69, for the reasons discussed infra part III.
In Cekacan, OJ.L 299/64 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC
2099, and several other decisions discussed infra part V.D, the Commission exempted a joint venture that did extend to distribution.
37. But see Odin, OJ.L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832; Konsortium ECR
900, O.J. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082; infra part
V.A.6.
38. WANO/Schwarzpulver, O.J. L 322/26, at 31,
2(d) (1978), [1979] 1
C.M.L.R. 403, 412. This joint venture was not concerned with R & D, but provided
ICI with an assured source of supply for its entire requirements of black powder from
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ties and strong inducements" for market sharing in safety
fuses ."

The parties may respond to the Commission's concern by
arranging that only a limited number of employees work on
the joint venture and that these do not come into contact with
the parent's other employees more than is necessary. This is
sometimes called a "Chinese wall." The parties may agree that
the joint venture will hire its own personnel and that they will
not themselves employ anyone that has worked for the joint
venture. Nevertheless, it is difficult to prevent top management from realizing that collaboration on other products
might be desirable.
C. Foreclosure
The Commission should be concerned by a bottleneck
monopoly only when firms with independent access to rare resources combine to create a monopoly, in which case the Commission may want to ensure access for others.40 The Commission should not be concerned when a joint venture develops a
unique resource, since it is more competitive to have one
source than none.
a joint venture with a competitor after ICI's plant was burned down. The group
effect was not the only cause for concern.
39. Id.
40. This concern may be exemplified by the Commission's informal action in
IGR Stereo Television. This joint venture related to the joint purchase and exploitation
of existing technology by German firms that competed with each other.
A trade association representing the German manufacturers of stereo television
sets acquired the patent rights needed to make stereo television sets and granted
licenses to its members. The Commission closed its file only when the association
ended its refusal to grant licenses to a Finnish non-member operating in Germany.
COMMISSION ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 63 (1982).
Three years later the Commission reported that the license fees charged were
too high, and it intervened again to persuade the parties to reduce the royalties.
COMMISSION FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 76 (1985).
It is not clear whether there was more than one way of making stereo television
sets, but the acquisition was collective. The transaction resembled a patent pool in as
much as several competitors acquired exclusive fights to technology.
See also Tetra Pak I, oj. L 272/27 (1988), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 47, where the
holder of technology acquired the exclusive licensee of competing technology and
was persuaded by the Commission to abrogate the exclusive element of the license.
The decision was confirmed by the Court of First Instance in Tetra Pak Rausing
SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R -, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334, on the
narrow issue that the acquisition of an exclusive license exempted by regulation
might infringe Article 86.
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Nevertheless, the lack of substitutes is an example of the
circumstances in which the Commission has power to intervene to withdraw the benefit of the group exemptions for collaboration in R & D and for patent or know-how licensing.4
That power, however, is discretionary, and if the Commission
seeks to exercise it, the parties have a chance to argue that the
Commission should think ex ante, and not remove the incentives to developing technology jointly by taking away the protection on which the commercial activity was based.42
The Commission also is concerned that the joint venture
may be over-inclusive and leave too few independent firms
with particular technology or other resources to compete by
collaborating with outsiders.43 This may occur when more
than one of the parties has a technological lead over outside
competitors. In the two recent clearances where the parties
had complementary technology, the Commission expressly
mentioned that there were other competitors in each field, so
that other joint ventures were not foreclosed.44
D. Ancillary Restrictions-The Need for Each Party to Appropriate
the Benefits of Its Investment
Clearly, the Commission is right to check that cartel ar41. See Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, art. 9(2), O.J. L 219/15,(1984),
corrected version in OJ. L 113/34 (1985) (patent licensing); Commission Regulation
No. 418/85, art. 10(d), O.J. L 53/5 (1985) (R & D); Commission Regulation No. 556/
89, art. 7(2), OJ. L 61/1 (1989) (know-how licensing).
42. See Faull, supra note 4, at 366 (pointing out that one of conditions for exemption is that competition not be eliminated).
43. See article 3 of the group exemption for R & D, Commission Regulation No.
418/85, OJ. L 53/5 (1985), which prevents the regulation from applying when the
parties' aggregate market shares exceed 20 percent, discussed infra part IV.A.3. The
Commission is concerned that if the aggregate market shares are too high, there may
be no one with whom other firms may collaborate. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 19, 27
(1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 841; Konsortium ECR 900, § II(2)(a), OJ. L 228/31,
at 33 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082, 2085; infra part V.A.6
(discussing decisions).
This kind of foreclosure may explain the Commission's refusal to exempt
Eurosport in Screensport/EBU Members, OJ. L 63/32 (1991); Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2092. Sky television was to collaborate with all the members of
the European Broadcasting Union, the main suppliers of sports television programmes in Europe.
44. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 19, 27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 891; Konsortium ECR 900, O.J. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC
2082; see infra part V.A.6 (discussing decisions).

266 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LI WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:248

rangements are not attached to or concealed by a valid joint
venture. Ancillary restrictions should be only as wide as is necessary to make the basic transaction viable. Under U.S. case
law, ancillary restrictions need be only reasonably necessary,
and it is irrelevant that a slightly less restrictive provision could
be devised with the advantage of hindsight.4 5 Nevertheless,
unlike the Court,4 6 the Commission seems to consider whether
ancillary restrictions are justified mainly when granting an exemption under Article 85(3) and rarely when considering
whether the agreement restricts competition contrary to Arti4
cle 85(1). 1
As suggested in part I.B above, unless each investor be
satisfied that it will receive the agreed share of the benefits if
the joint venture proves successful, he is unlikely to commit

resources to a joint venture. Ensuring a return is difficult
enough for a single innovating firm, especially when it is not
clear whether patent protection will be possible and affordable,
and third parties may take a free ride. When the work is done
jointly, it is even more difficult to ensure that each party can
appropriate the fruits of its investment and that the others do
45. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898). Then-Circuit Judge Taft said: "Before such agreements [in partial restraint of
trade] are upheld, however, the court must find that the restraints attempted thereby
are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment by the buyer of the property, goodwill, or
interest in the partnership bought; or to the legitimate ends of the existing partnership." Id. at 281.
Despite the different language of the Community decisions, there is no apparent
difference of substance. The Commission does not always consider whether a
slightly less restrictive alternative exists. See, for example, the Commission's Notice
Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, OJ. C 203/5 (1990), which said
that "[necessary] means that in their [the restrictions'] absence the concentration
could not be implemented or could only be implemented under more uncertain conditions, at substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer period or with considerably less probability of success. This must be judged on an objective basis." Id.
§ 11(5), at 6.
See also Odin, OJ. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832; infra part V.A.6.
46. See, e.g., Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Shillgalis,
Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414; Remia BV and Verenigde
Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 1; Nungesser (L.G.) KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission, Case 257/78,
[1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278; Socit6 Technique Minire v. Mas-'
chinenbau Ulm, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
47. The Sub-Contracting Notice, O.J. C 1/2 (1979), is a notable exception. See
also recital 2 to the R & D exemption, Commission Regulation No. 418/85, OJ. L
53/5 (1985), considered infra part IV.A.
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not over-exploit the results.48 It can be done only by contract,
which must be enforceable.
Often it is impossible to foretell at the time the agreement
is being negotiated how much the work will cost or whether it
will be successful, let alone how successful. In which case it is
difficult to specify in advance an appropriate royalty to be paid
to the person whose input is more valuable or who exploits the
results less. Where the work of the parties is interactive, it may
be impossible for an arbitrator to attribute realistic relative values to the contributions, even ex post. Sometimes, neither contribution has any value without that of the other. Often the
only possible formula for joint R & D where the parties expect
to exploit the results for the same purpose is that each party
will provide or pay for a specified proportion of the work or
cost and that each will benefit from the results in the same proportion. Quotas may be agreed or the joint venture may sell
on behalf of the parties.
There will almost inevitably be an important clause in the
joint venture agreement restraining the parties from developing similar technology independently of the joint venture.
Such a restriction may be justified on the ground that where a
firm given confidential information is carrying on independent
research or development, it is difficult to establish whether the
confidential information has been misappropriated. Moreover, a party investing in developing new ideas must ensure
that the ideas are used, and is likely to want to discourage its
partners from developing competing technology.
Should these provisions be seen as anti-competitive restrictions or as ancillary restraints necessary to induce co-operation that may increase competition? For how long can they be
shown to be indispensable? Ex post, the joint venture may result in a single seller, or ancillary restrictions may impose quotas on both parties and prevent each from licensing third parties. The joint venture may foreclose if there are no firms with
which the remaining firms in an industry can collaborate. If
there are only a few firms in a market protected by high entry
barriers, these restrictions on conduct are important. Perceived after the results have been obtained successfully, the
48. Alexis Jacquemin & Bernard Spinoit, Economic and Legal Aspects of Cooperative
Research: A European View, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 487 (Barry Hawk ed., 1986).
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market might be more competitive if the parties competed with
each other.
On the other hand, in some circumstances, without some
form of quota and exclusive provisions, neither party could be
sure of reaping the fruits of its investment in the joint research.
To provide sufficient incentives, the protection may have to
last well beyond the period of the research and development,
so that the benefits can be reaped when the collaboration can
be exploited. It is possible that neither party would supply its
best technology if the other could use the technology to compete with it, or would be able to do so shortly. Such restrictions on conduct may thus be necessary for several years or
even decades after the investment starts to bring in profits.4 9
On this view, the restrictions are ancillary and may increase
competition if they enable each party to appropriate the expected benefit of its investment and, so, make the joint venture
viable.
III. CONDITIONS AND OBLIGATIONS MAY BE ATTACHED
TO AN EXEMPTION
The Commission has increased its discretionary powers by
exempting joint ventures for R & D rather than stating that
they do not infringe the prohibition of Article 85(1). Its exclusive power under Regulation No. 17 to grant individual exemptions has enabled it to attach conditions and obligations to
an exemption. 50
49. It may be impossible to calculate in advance the period required. It will
depend, ex ante, on a discounted cash flow analysis. The expected cost of the investment must be recouped from the chances of profit.
It is usually unclear, when a joint venture is being negotiated what it will cost,
whether it will be successful and what prices can be charged on exploiting the results.
The expected profits must be discounted by the likelihood of failure and the lag of
benefits after costs. Moreover, a risk premium will apply, since most firms are risk
averse and R & D, especially joint R & D, is inherently risky.
If the parties are not permitted to restrict competition between each other for
long enough to recoup the costs and a reasonable profit, they will have less incentive
to make the investments.
Until recently, however, the Commission assumed that any firm sufficiently interested to invest in a joint venture was a potential competitor even if, as in Vacuum
Interrupters, 0.J. L 48/32 (1977), [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. D67, it had given up the work
individually because of the high cost and small chance of success.
50. The exemptions must be for a limited period, so the Commission has an-
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In De Laval/Stork,5" for instance, De Laval was part of a
large U.S. group of companies just beginning to sell compressors and turbines in Europe. Stork was part of a Dutch group
of companies operating under a technology license 5 2 from De
Laval and had an under-used factory and a more effective sales
force in Europe. The firms were beginning to become actual
competitors,5" but had complementary strengths to contribute.
The Commission exempted the collaboration for fifteen years
from the joint venture, but subject to conditions that would
enable Stork to operate independently thereafter.
The market was one in which each order had to be specifically designed by adapting basic designs. A single team of engineers had to negotiate a contract with a client, cooperate
technically with each client to design a product, work out a
production program and carry out the after-sales service,
which was an important element of competition. Contrary to
its preferred practice, the Commission exempted a transaction
which included joint sales as well as joint design and manufacture.
The Commission wished to ensure, however, that when
the agreement expired each party would be entitled to a license of the technology that had been licensed to the joint venture, but on a most favoured licensee basis, rather than on the
basis agreed by the parties. It required that each be entitled to
sell products made thereby not only in the Common Market
but also outside, presumably throughout the world. The Commission's condition may have affected the commercial balance
of the agreement, since 85 percent of the products made by
the joint venture were derived from the basic designs contributed by De Laval. Worse still, since each party provided some
other chance to intervene when they expire. Often, it requires that it be informed
about specified activities and progress.
51. O.J. L 215/11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. D69.
52. The license was granted in 1969, two years before the joint venture agreement. Id. § I(C), at 12, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at D76. The Commission perceived the
collaboration only as of 1971, id. § I(D)(3), at 14, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at D76, by which
time Stork was just viable in the market as a result of the license. Had the collaboration been perceived as of 1969, when the license was granted, it is not clear that Stork
would have been able to enter. Id. § 111(12), at 17, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at D82.
53. Id. § 11(4), at 15, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at D78. Six years later, by the time of
the decision in 1977, the parties supplied between 10 and 15 percent of the various
products affected. Id. § 111(12), at 17, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at D82.
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technology to the joint venture, each was placed in a position
to renegotiate the entire agreement at the time the Commission suggested or required amendments. Each could refuse to
renegotiate the contract as required by the Commission, leaving the exclusive provisions unenforceable. Indeed, if the parties do not agree to amend their agreement, it might be argued
that the joint venture between actual or potential competitors
was, itself, void. That would be most unsatisfactory.
I have no reason to think that any renegotiation took
place. Fear of a condition being imposed, however, has deterred some firms from notifying their joint ventures to the
Commission. Seen ex post, when De Laval had already made its
technology available to the European firm, the changes required by the Commission may have made the market more
competitive. Each firm may be more competent to enter the
field when the exemption expires.5 4 The decision has deterred
other firms from notifying joint ventures, however, and the risk
of having to renegotiate may deter some firms from entering
into a joint venture that otherwise would have been viable and
have increased competition. Many firms abide by their agreements even when they are not enforceable because they value
their reputation for commercial honesty or because they need
a good relationship with the other party in other markets, but
an opportunity to renegotiate does increase the risk of the
other party not performing.
When dealing informally with joint ventures, sometimes
before they are finally concluded, but sometimes several years
afterwards, the Commission often identifies its concerns, and
the parties are under considerable pressure to amend their
agreements to meet them.5 5 The opportunity to renegotiate at
this stage also deters some parties from notifying agreements
and a few from making them.
IV. THE GROUP EXEMPTION, REGULATION NO. 418/85
One of the ways in which the Commission attempted to
54. In De Laval/Stork [2], OJ. L 59/32 (1988), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 714, however,
the Commission renewed the exemption because, during a recession in the industry,
the joint venture did not thrive. The Commission decided that the parties still
needed to collaborate to enter the market effectively. Id. § II(B)(6), at 34, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. at 718.
55. See, e.g., Faull, supra note 4, at 359.

1991-19921

COLLABORATIVE JOINT VENTURES

confer legal validity on joint ventures that might make the market more competitive was to grant a group exemption. By the
mid-1980s, members of the Commission were making
speeches claiming that the Community favoured research and
development, even if carried out in collaboration.56
A. CollaborationLimited to R & D Seldom Infringes Article 85(1)
The most important provision in the regulation may well
be its second recital, which reiterates what was said in the notice on cooperation agreements of 1968:"7 "[A]greements on
the joint execution of research work or the joint development
of the results of the research, up to but not including the stage
of industrial application, generally do not fall within the scope
of Article 85(1) of the Treaty." 58
Eric White, who drafted the regulation, states 59 that this
confirms the earlier notice and suggests that the Commission
might no longer follow its earlier decisions asserting that
agreements merely discouraging R & D infringe Article
85(1).6o Moreover, article l(1)(c) of the regulation also contains language that was not strictly necessary and which casts
doubt on whether joint R & D not extending to joint exploitation does often infringe Article 85(1).
The idea behind recital 2 is that basic research which does
not envisage any commercial product in particular is unlikely
to affect competition in any particular market. So, collaboration on basic research does not infringe Article 85(1) and need
not be brought within the terms of the group exemption.
56. E.g., Commission Press Release, IP (84) 471 (1984).
57. See supra part I.D.5.
58. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, recital 2, O.J. L 53/5, at 5 (1985). The
Commission qualified this statement by adding in recital 2:
In certain circumstances, however, such as where the parties agree not to
carry out other research and development in the same field, thereby forgoing the opportunity of gaining competitive advantages over the other parties, such agreements may fall within Article 85(1) and should therefore not
be excluded from this Regulation.
Id.
59. White, supra note 4, at 667.
60. Id. Although, as stated supra part I.D.4, the Commission is empowered to
grant group exemptions to certain kinds of agreements, it has no power to grant
group negative clearances. A recital in a group exemption that specified kinds of
agreements that do not infringe Article 85(1) may be a device for remedying this
lacuna in its powers.
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B. Narrow Ambit of the Group Exemption
The exemption is, however, narrow. 6 ' It exempts three
kinds of agreement for collaboration in R & D: (1) joint R & D;
(2) joint R & D together with its exploitation; and (3) joint exploitation of the results of collaboration in R & D carried out
by the same parties under an earlier agreement.6 2
Joint venturers will often be concerned that the other parties may carry out similar R & D on their own or with third
parties, because it is so difficult to establish whether they are
misappropriating technology contributed to the joint venture.6 3 Contractual restraints for this purpose, however, may
prevent the application of the group exemption. Article
4(l)(a) and (b) permits an obligation not to carry out R & D
independently in relation to a field closely connected to the

program, while article 6(a) blacklists such a clause relating to
an unconnected field. If the parties define their program fairly
broadly, they may be better able to prevent some from taking a
free ride on the others' technology.
Further difficulty is caused when the parties want to ensure that each gets a share of the exploitation sufficient to induce its investment. The exemption does not apply where
61. I analyzed its provisions in the context of the case law of the Commission in
VALENTINE KORAH, R & D JOINT VENTURES AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 418/85 (1986). I analyzed it more shortly and stressed the narrowness of its

application in Valentine Korah, Research and Development, Joint Ventures and the European
Economic Community Competition Rules, 3 INT'LJ. TECH. MGMT. 7 (1988).

62. Article 2 of Commission Regulation No. 418/85, OJ. L 53/5 (1985), imposes conditions relating to the terms of the transaction, while article 3 imposes conditions relating to market share and duration. Article 4 lists certain ancillary restrictions that are also exempted, and article 5 other provisions unlikely to restrict competition but which are exempted just in case they are caught by the prohibition of
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1. Paragraph 2 of articles 4 and 5 extends
their scope to -provisions having a similar but lesser effect. Article 6 provides the
black list of provisions that prevent the application of the exemption.
There follow the provisions usual in a block exemption: the opposition procedure; the confidentiality of information given thereunder; a definition of "connected
undertakings;" a provision for the Commission to terminate the exemption by decision; and transitional provisions relating to agreements made before the regulation
was adopted, and which are amended to come within its terms. The regulation applies from March 1, 1985 until the end of 1997, when it is likely to be revised and
readopted.
63. This was accepted by the Commission in Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 20, 32
(1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 843.
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there is joint distribution. 64 Evenjoint production is permitted
only if the results are decisive. 65 Each party may want to ensure that too big a slice of the results is not sold by the others.
Article 6(c) prevents the regulation from applying where the
parties "are restricted as to the quantity of the contract products they may manufacture or sell or as to the number of operations employing the contract process they may carry out."
"Restricted" is a broad term, so it is not possible to circumvent
the provision by limiting the raw materials or factory space to
be used to make the products.66 The allocation of customers is
prevented by article 6(e), save in so far as a field-of-use restriction is permitted by article 4(1)(e).
Limited territorial protection between the parties is permitted, although less than under the group exemptions for
technology licensing or distribution, since the parties to a joint
venture may well be competitors or potential competitors. 68
Article 4(1)(d) permits a restriction on manufacturing in the
64. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, arts. 2(e), (f), O.J. L 53/5, at 8 (1985).
65. Id. art. 2(d).
66. Mr. Ryder, whom I thank at the beginning of this Article, has raised the
possibility of using royalties to ensure adequate returns. Each party might be required to pay royalties to the joint venture in an amount at least equal to the cost
savings of the innovation. The parties could thus share in the benefit in proportion
to their investment, regardless of the degree to which each exploits the discovery.
Article 5(1)(f) and (g) white-lists as not infringing Article 85(1) of the Treaty an obligation to pay royalties to other parties for unequal contributions or services, or unequal exploitation, as well as an obligation to share royalties obtained from outsiders.
The difficulty would be, as in other contexts, devising the formula for calculating the
appropriate royalty.
To go further and provide that the royalties increase with the degree of exploitation might come within the broad language of article 6(c) and prevent the application
of the regulation.
67. Article 4 of Commission Regulation No. 418/85 provides that
[t]he exemption provided for in Article 1 shall also apply to the following
restrictions of competition imposed on the parties: ...
(e) an obligation to restrict the manufacture of the contract products or
application of the contract processes to one or more technical fields of application, except where two or more of the parties are competitors within
the meaning of Article 3 at the time the agreement is entered into.
Commission Regulation No. 418/85, art. 4, OJ. L 53/5, at 9 (1985). It is not clear
how far this goes, as it is not clear what is meant by a "technical field of application."
68. Contrast article 5 of the two group exemptions for technology licensing: the
patent licensing agreements, Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15
(1984), corrected version in O.J. C 113/34 (1985), and the know-how licensing agreements, Commission Regulation No. 556/89, O.J. L 61/1 (1989), which go far towards excluding horizontal agreements.
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territories reserved to the other parties. Since such a clause
contemplates joint exploitation, the agreement would be exempt only when the results of the collaboration are sufficiently
important to qualify under article 2(d). Article 4(1)(f) allows
protection against the other parties actively seeking customers
in a reserved territory for a period of five years after the goods
are first put on the market in the Common Market, but article
6(f) blacklists any further territorial restrictions on sales. From
the outset, each party must be permitted to accept unsolicited
orders.
Given the importance of integrating the Common Market
it seems surprising that the Commission permits some territorial protection, rather than quotas or joint sales, which might
be expected to divide the Common Market less.
Often ajoint venture is set up with the objective of finding
an outlet for some by-product, but although the parties may
agree to buy the contract products only from the person who
manufactures them under the agreement, they may not agree
that the producer should buy its raw materials only from the
parents or one of them. 69 Article 6(g) also causes difficulty.
The exemption does not apply where the parties "are prohibited from allowing third parties to manufacture the contract
products or apply the contract processes in the absence ofjoint
manufacture." 7 Eric White explains that an obligation to license third parties only with the consent of the other parties is
exempted by article 1, and the Commission fears that in the
absence of joint manufacture, it might lead to a policy of
neither producing nor licensing outsiders at all. 7 ' Where,
however, at least one of the parties is exploiting the technology
individually, there seems to be no policy reason for including
this item in the black list.
C. Conclusion on Group Exemption
I have never seen an agreement that clearly came within
the group exemption. Where the parties are not at least strong
69. Such a provision was exempted in Cekacan, o.J. L 299/64 (1990), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2099, on the ground that it was necessary if the
parties were to form the joint venture. In my view, that provision should, in that
event, have been cleared.
70. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, art. 6(g), O.J. L 53/5, at 10 (1985).
71. White, supra note 4, at 695.
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potential competitors, the agreement may well not restrict
competition.72 When they are, it is likely that each will need
some protection to ensure that the others do not obtain too
much of the benefit if the R & D is successful. Joint sales are
not exempted,73 and quotas or the allocation of customers are
blacklisted. Only limited territorial protection is permitted, or
a field-of-use restriction. All too often one cannot foretell the
likely value of the results or cost of the R & D, so it is seldom
possible to specify royalties for unequal exploitation or contributions.
There is the additional difficulty about having to permit
other parties to sub-license background technology where the
exploitation of the results requires such a license. Care must
also be taken to see that the restriction on carrying out R & D
independently of the joint venture does not extend beyond
closely connected fields. So the regulation seldom applies.
The most important provision in the group exemption is
the recital stating that collaboration confined to R & D rarely
infringes Article 85(1), although where the parties need the results for the same purpose they are likely to need restrictions
on exploitation.
72. See Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 19, 27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 841;
Konsortium ECR 900, O.J. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [19901 2
CEC 2082; Optical Fibres, OJ. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813; infra parts V.A.3, V.A.6 (discussing decisions).
73. Draft Notice on the Appraisal of Collaborative Joint Ventures, IV/647/91EN (Eur. Comm'nJan. 1992) [hereinafter Draft Notice]; see Barry Hawk,Joint Ventures
Under EEC Law, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 303, 345 app. (1991-1992) (reprinting text of

Draft Notice). The memorandum accompanying the draft stated that the Commission may amend the regulation so as to include joint distribution by a joint venture
subject to a market share limit of 10 percent.
In June 1991, a senior official, Mr. G6tz Drauz, speaking in his private capacity at
a conference organised by ESC in Milan, stated that the Commission is thinking of
revising the regulation so as to permit joint sales. This should make it far more useful. On the other hand, joint selling cuts out all competition in distribution between
the parties, so it is anomalous that other less extreme forms of protection, such as
quotas not extending to the total turnover, should remain black listed. Let us hope
they will not.
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V. GROUNDS ON WHICH AGREEMENTS MAY BE HELD
NOT TO INFRINGE ARTICLE 85(1)
A. More Realistic Attitude to be Taken Towards Potential
Competition
Even before starting to draft the group exemption, the
Commission took other steps to reduce the number of cases
where it would have to grant individual exemptions. In my
view, this is the more satisfactory course, although the precedents have not been consistent.
1. Commission's Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy
In its Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy"4 for 1983, the
Commission stated that it would look more realistically before
finding that the parties to a joint venture are potential competitors.7 5 It said that the Commission would consider each
party's ability to finance the operation independently, the productive capacity of each party, its familiarity with the process
technology, the size of the demand, and the distribution facilities of each party, as well as the ability of each to bear the risk.
It seemed that the Commission was prepared to analyze
the situation ex ante, at the time the joint venture was entered
into and neither party had access to the other's resources.
Businessmen and their advisers hoped for clearance, not exemption, of agreements between those with complementary
resources, or where the risk was too great for a single firm, and
so on.
Jonathan Faull, one of the two officials who dealt with
most joint ventures in the coordination division of the Commission's Competition Department at that time, stated that
"supply rather than demand considerations are likely to be im-

portant. "76
74. COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 50-52 (1984).
75. Id. at 50, 55 (stating that "all relevant factors must be taken into account
which determine not only actual but also potential competition. The Commission is
determined to make its assessment of potential competition in the most realistic way
possible.").
76. Faull, supra note 4, at 361. This is significant, because in other areas of competition law, the Commission has frequently defined relevant markets by reference
only to demand conditions, which frequently operate more rapidly.
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2. BP/Kellogg
In its next two decisions, the Commission indeed did not
find that the parties were potential competitors, but in the first
case, BP/Kellogg,7 found that ancillary restrictions it described
as "reasonable and necessary" restricted competition and required exemption. The parties had complementary technology: BP had begun to develop a catalyst it thought would be
useful for making ammonia; Kellogg designed and built process plants. BP realized that it could not complete the development of the process without help. The two firms agreed to
collaborate to design a plant to make ammonia using BP's catalyst. BP agreed to sell its catalyst only to Kellogg's customers,
and Kellogg agreed not to invest in developing ways of producing ammonia that did not use the catalyst, without notifying
BP and giving it a chance to withdraw from the contract. This
arrangement for limited exclusivity on both sides was found to
restrict competition contrary to Article 85(1), but was exempted on the ground that the ancillary restrictions were reasonable and necessary. If they were reasonable and necessary
to induce the investment, it is difficult to see how they restricted any competition that was possible. 8
The Commission does not always speak with one voice or
think with one mind. Different officials perceive problems differently. Although there seems to be an increasing tendency
to approach transactions ex ante, there have been occasions
where this is not done under Article 85(1) but only under Article 85(3).
3. Optical Fibres
Fibres,7 9

In Optical
Coming Glass had developed optical
fibres which revolutionized the technology used for telecommunications networks. It entered into two joint ventures to
produce the fibres with makers of telephone cable in Europe,
77. OJ. L 369/6, at 8, 15(c) (1985), [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, 623.
78. The parties did not operate in the same markets, but the Commission might
have thought that the agreement foreclosed other technology. There would be no
one with the catalyst with whom other process plant designers could collaborate and
no other process plant designers with whom anyone finding a catalyst for making
ammonia could collaborate.
79. OJ. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,813. See generally Korah, supra note 18.
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one with BICC in the United Kingdom and one with Siemens
in the Federal Republic of Germany. There were two other
joint ventures in the Common Market, one between Coming
and a French cable maker, which was likely to be exempted
once it had been renegotiated to conform to the joint ventures
with BICC and Siemens, and another was being negotiated by
Coming with a Spanish firm. Corning had also granted
licenses to firms in other Member States.
The Commission expressly found that each individual
joint venture did not restrict competition, since the parties
contributed complementary technology.8 0 Unaided, the cable
makers could not have produced the fibres, nor Coming the
cables. The Commission also found, however, that the network of joint ventures with a common technology provider restricted competition and required exemption since the market
in which the joint venture sold was concentrated.
The Commission accepted that a license to a joint venture
is a good way to disseminate technology8 and stated that each
joint venture would not infringe Article 85(1) because neither
party could enter the other's market. This was the precedent
for which we had been waiting since the Commission's Thirteenth Report stating that where not more than one of the parties
could enter the market, a joint venture does not have an inherent anti-competitive effect.
In Optical Fibres, the Commission added that a network of
joint ventures does infringe Article 85(1) when a provider of
technology has a .substantial interest in and control over each
joint venture and the market is oligopolistic. 8 2 It stressed
Corning's influential position in the joint ventures. From the
remedies imposed, its theory seems to be that Coming might
prevent the expansion of one joint venture in order to protect
one or more of the others.
It granted an exemption only after several changes were
made to the agreement: (a) Coming reduced its managerial
control, (b) the sales licenses ceased to be exclusive, (c) the
80.
Binder]
81.
11,900.
82.
11,899.

Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30, at 36,
46 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813, at 11,898.
Id. at 38, 59, [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
Id. at 37,

48, [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
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territorial protection was reduced below that permitted by the
patent licensing regulation, (d) either party was entitled to expand the capacity of the joint venture, either with the consent
of the other or, if that was refused, by paying for the additional
capacity and taking a larger share of the output, (e) the Commission required Coming to give both the other party and the
joint ventures an option for a non-exclusive license of the technology on termination, and (f) several other provisions were
added to ensure that information about each joint venture's
prices and output was not passed on to the others. It is not
clear how far most of these changes were compelled by the
Commission.
Personally, I doubt whether it was necessary to ensure that
Coming did not restrict the expansion of one joint venture in
order to enable another to maintain high prices. The technology was revolutionary, and the holder had a huge incentive to
increase production in order to develop improvements before
its competitors could exploit the technology as its patents expired. Paul Lasok has observed, however, that the theory applies more forcefully when the common party contributes
something other than technology.83
4. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra
In Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra,84 too, the Commission held that

an exclusive know-how license from Sofiltra to a joint venture
between it and Mitchell Cotts for making sophisticated air filters did not restrict competition in the market for manufacture
because only Sofiltra had the technology to make the filters,
and the parties' aggregate market share in the Common Market was too small to foreclose others.85 It held, however, that
the exclusive license to the joint venture to produce and sell
did restrict competition and required exemption since Sofiltra
could compete for sales with the joint venture.86 It is not easy
to reconcile these two paragraphs. How could the joint ven83. Mr. Lasok made this observation at a meeting of the Brussels Chamber of
Commerce organised by M. P. Madou shortly after the decision was published.
84. OJ. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111 [hereinafter Mitchell Cotts].
85. Id. at 35-36,
20, 23, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 119-21.
86. Id. at 35, 20, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 119-20. Contrast Konsortium ECR 900,
OJ. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082, discussed infra
part V.A.6.
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ture have sold at all without a license to make the sophisticated
filters? The Commission seems to have slipped into ex post
thinking.8 7
The case was particularly interesting because the Commission cleared an ancillary restraint whereby the joint venture
agreed not to compete with the parents, although such clauses
are blacklisted by the block exemption for R & D. This seems
to remain the Commission's view: in the draft notice,8 8 the
Commission confirmed that
[w]hen a JV involves the creation of new production capacity or the transfer of technology from the parent companies,
the obligation imposed on the JV not to manufacture or
market products competing with the licensed products may
be regarded as ancillary; the JV must seek to ensure the
sucess of the new production unit, without depriving the
parent companies of the necessary control over exploitation
and dissemination of their technology. [Mitchell Cotts
cited] .89

5. BBC Brown Boveri/NGK
In BBC Brown Boveri/NGK,90 the Commission exempted a
joint venture agreement which, in my view and that of others,
87. Contrast Konsortium ECR 900, O.J. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082, infra part V.A.6.
Also contrast the Draft Notice, supra note 73:
A clause which bars the parent companies from competing with the JV or
from competing actively with it on its territory, at least during the startingup period, may be regarded as ancillary. Additional restrictions relating to
quantities, prices or customers, and bans on exports obviously go beyond
what is required for the setting-up and proper operation of the JV.
The following in particular have been regarded as necessary during the
starting-up period of a JV designed to enable a parent company to become
established on a new market: territorial restrictions imposed on that parent
company, through the grant to theJV of an exclusive manufacturing licence,
in respect of fields of application or product markets in which both the JV
and that parent company are active. [Mitchell Cotts cited].
On the other hand the grant to the JV of an exclusive exploitation licence has been regarded as necessary (without any time-limit other than the
duration of the JV itself) in cases where the parent company granting it was
not active in the same field of application or on the same product market as
that for which the licence was granted. [Odin cited].
Draft Notice, supra note 73, reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app. at 364.
88. Draft Notice, supra note 73, reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app.
89. Id., reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app. at 363.
90. OJ. L 301/68 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 610.

1991-19921

COLLABORATIVE JOINT VENTURES

should have been cleared as it did not restrict any competition
that was possible without it. BBC was trying to develop a sodium sulphur battery for use in vehicles, but lacked technology
in the ceramics required for insulation. NGK had developed
the technology for ceramics and was prepared to pay for the R
& D, but had no access to technology relating to batteries. The
Commission alleged that NGK would become a potential competitor of BBC when it acquired the latter's technology
through its share in the joint venture9 ' and that, consequently,
its agreement not to export from the Far East products made
by using BBC's technology to those parts of the Common Market where BBC did not enjoy patent protection infringed Article 85(1) and required exemption.92
This must be an aberration. The Commission implied in
BP/Kellogg, and stated expressly in Optical Fibres93 and Mitchell
94
Cotts,

that collaboration does not, in itself, restrict competi-

tion where not more than one of the parties could have accomplished the task of the joint venture independently. In deciding whether the parties were potential competitors, the Commission looked ex ante to the position that would have existed
without the joint venture and license. In BBC Brown Boveri/
NGK, the Commission accepted that neither could have developed the insulated batteries without the other, and therefore
should have cleared the arrangement.
6. Odin and Konsortium ECR 900
In 1990, the Commission adopted two decisions clearing
joint ventures involving R & D which were fully in line with its
statement of intention in the Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy. In Elopak/Metal Box-Odin,95 the parties agreed to collabo91. Id. at 69, 5, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 612.
92. Id. at 71, 18, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 615. It also stated that the obligations
of NGK and the joint venture not to carry out joint R & D with other parties restricted competition. Id. at 70-71, 17, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 615. In Mitchell Cotts,
O.J. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111, such an obligation was cleared as an
ancillary restraint necessary to make the joint venture viable.
93. O.J. L 236/30, at 36, 46 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813, at 11,898.
94. Mitchell Cotts, OJ. L 41/31, at 35, 19 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111, 119.
95. O.J. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832. The notice under article
19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17, supra note 2, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87,
was published three years earlier, which may indicate an internal struggle within the
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rate, through Odin, their joint venture, to develop a carton
with a metal lid that could store particulate food that was sensitive to oxygen, together with the machinery for making and
aseptically filling the cartons. Metal Box had technology relating to metal containers, and Elopak had technology relating to
the making and filling of cartons in aseptic conditions. Both
elements of technology were required to develop the new
container, as was further work by the joint venture.
The Commission found that there was no inherent anticompetitive effect, because neither firm was even a potential
competitor of the other in relation to the R & D. 9 6 Each lacked
the other's technology, which made it very unlikely that either
would take the risk of developing such a product independently.9 7 This perception ex ante is quite incompatible with
BBC Brown Boveri and most welcome.
The Commission stated that the parties did not compete,
actually or even potentially in other activities, so there was no
danger of the collaboration extending to other fields. 98 It added that the creation of the joint venture was not likely to foreclose similar possibilities of collaboration for other potential
competitors. Apart from the fact that no market had yet developed on which to assess effects on competition, there were
other can makers with the kind of technology Metal Box was
providing, and other firms with non-exclusive licenses for the
Excello technology for making cartons. The Commission concluded:
28. As the parties could not realistically be regarded as
competitors, actual or potential, and the creation of the
joint venture entails no foreclosure risk, and the agreement
does not involve the creation of a network of competing
joint ventures, 99 the agreements to establish Odin do not
Commission as to whether to clear or exempt the agreement. For further discussion
of Odin, see Hawk, supra note 73, at 330-31.
96. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 19,
28 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 841.
97. Id. at 18-19, $$ 24-25, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 840.
98. Id. at 19,

26, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 841. For example, there was no group,

or spill-over, effect.
99. A reference to its decision in Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30 (1986), [19851988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813, where the Commission
was concerned that a technology provider which was party to several joint ventures
might restrain production in one, to keep up prices for another.
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fall within the terms of Article 85(l).1 °°
The Commission went on to analyze the ancillary provisions to ensure that they were no more than were necessary to
ensure the establishment and proper functioning of the joint
venture. The exclusive license of the parties' technology to
Odin within the joint venture's field of use was necessary to
guarantee to each party that the other would devote its full efforts to the project. This exclusivity was permitted to continue
beyond the start-up period because it had been necessary to
induce the parties to license their existing technology and invest in further development. This goes further than the open
exclusive license cleared in Nungesser (L. G.) KG and Kurt Eisele v.
Commission t ' in that the exclusive territory might continue beyond the period when the technology was new. It was the first
time the Commission has cleared such a clause in a joint venture, but there were several special circumstances: the license
related mainly to know-how, one element of which was to be
provided by each parent and which required further development; Odin was also to develop the necessary machinery; the
exclusive licenses were limited to a narrow field of use; and
there were no express restrictions as to price, quantity, cus02
tomers or territory. 1
Odin also received a non-exclusive license to improvements in the parents' technology. The parties were entitled to
carry on R & D in closely related and competing fields, provided that they used neither each other's know-how nor that of
Odin. The Commission accepted that these limitations were
necessary to protect the confidentiality of the know-how of
100. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 19, 28 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 841.
101. Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278. The Court ruled
in that case that an open exclusive license under plant breeders' rights for an important new variety did not, in itself, infringe Article 85(1) owing to the investments by
the innovator and the licensee. Id. at 2054-55,
56-58, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 353. In
subsequent decisions the Commission has never applied this ruling, since it states
that better technology for doing something already known is not new. See VALENTINE
KORAH, KNOW-How LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES-REGULATION 556/89, at 33-34 (1989).

102. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 20, 31 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 842. Such
a provision was hardly necessary since the joint venture was to produce and distribute. Neither party suffered the risk of over-exploitation of the results by the
other.
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each party. The parents were to receive non-exclusive licenses
of technology developed by Odin for other fields of use.
On termination, each party was to have the right to use the
know-how of the joint venture, and the know-how of the other
party in the same field as the joint venture. This would make it
easier for each party to terminate the joint venture, and would
help to prevent Metal Box from restricting the activities of
Odin. The Commission expressed some concern that Odin
might compete with one of its parents. It is feared that this is
another example of ex post thinking. Without the joint venture,
Metal Box would not have had to compete with it. So, if
Elopak could not have developed the technology on its own,
no possible competition was eliminated. In the instant case,
however, the Commission accepted that adequate safeguards
had been built into the contract to ensure that Metal Box was
unlikely to restrain its joint venture from competing with it.
The reference to these safeguards is reminiscent of the safeguards in Optical Fibres, based on the thinking of Joseph
Brodley. 0 5 The Commission seems less concerned that Metal
Box might hesitate to compete strongly with its joint venture.
The ancillary restrictions accepted by the parties were very
slight. Nevertheless, the decision is very important in showing
the willingness of the Commission to clear a joint venture for
an indefinite period that extended to joint distribution.
In its press release, 10 4 the Commission said that the case
has wider significance and stands for the principle that, where
the establishment of a joint venture is itself not caught by Article 85(1), all reasonable restrictions necessary for the formation and efficient operation of the joint venture will also escape
the prohibition. The agreement was cleared although it ex0 5
tended to joint distribution.1
The precedent is potentially very important. Provisions
blacklisted by the group exemption for R & D such as territorial protection or quotas may be reasonable and necessary to
103. Joseph Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95

HARV.

L. REV. 152

(1982).
104. Commission Press Release, IP (90) 582 (July 23, 1990). The statement was

not repeated in the COMMISSION TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1991),
but is confirmed in the Draft Notice, cited supra note 73.
105. This prevented the application of the regulation exempting collaboration
in R & D.
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induce the parties to invest in joint R & D.'" 6 So may limited
exclusivity.
This decision was followed two weeks later by another
clearance: Konsortium ECR 900.107 Fifteen post, telegram and
telephone administrations, including all of those in the EEC,
agreed to introduce a pan-European public digital cellular mobile telecommunications service-GSM-in their countries in
1991. This would enable people to use a single mobile phone
in all fifteen countries. There was to be a uniform standard
with two or three specified interfaces, although the technology
was not required to be uniform. This planned GSM system did
not yet exist when the decision was adopted. Invitations to
tender were published in January 1988. Three corporate
groups formed Konsortium ECR 900 in order to submit joint
tenders for system equipment, which did not include end products (mobile telephones). Eight other individual firms or consortia emerged as possible suppliers.
The Commission found that the three firms in Konsortium
ECR 900 could not have developed and produced the systems
individually. Not only was the development cost of the order
of DM300-500 million, there was a limited number of sufficiently qualified engineers to develop the system rapidly. The
risk was substantial, as there were only fifteen buyers of systems conforming to the GSM standard. The short deadlines
would prevent the cost being spread over time and the education of further engineers. The invitations for tender expressly
referred to consortia and bidding syndicates, which shows that
buyers from the consortium accepted the need for collaboration.
The Commission held that not only did the joint development and manufacture not restrict competition within the
Common Market, joint sales did not do so, either. Since none
of the parties could have manufactured individually, they
would have had nothing to sell without the joint venture.' 0 8
This reasoning ex ante is most important. If without joint R &
D the parties would not have developed the results, joint sales,
106. This is not accepted in the Draft Notice. See Hawk, supra note 73, app.
(reprinting Draft Notice).
107. OJ. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2082.
108. Contrast Mitchell Cotts, OJ. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111, discussed supra part V.A.4.
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quotas, or other allocations of the market might be cleared on
similar reasoning, although in Odin the Commission expressly
stated that there were no such limitations on the joint venture.
The motivation of ECR Konsortium 900 is extraordinarily short
for a decision that seems to depart from earlier precedents and
that is related to an agreement between three competitors.
The Commission did not, consider whether the habit of collaboration might have been extended to other fields. Given that
eight other consortia or individual firms were able to make
bids, foreclosure cannot have been a problem.
It is surprising that no analysis of the ancillary terms is
given to ensure that they were the minimum necessary, 0 9 except in relation to a party excluded from the consortium for
breach of contract. Such a party forfeited its right to use the
technical documentation of the others. The Commission
found that this did not restrict competition on the ground that
use of the others' technology would enable a party in breach to
obtain an unjustified competitive benefit vis-d-vis the other parties. The Commission asserted that such competition would
not be based on performance, a term that seems to be drawn
from the Court's judgments on abuse of a dominant position.
This decision goes further than Odin in that it is not based
on the ancillary restrictions being very narrow. It goes less far
in that the parties can each terminate at the end of 1993 and
subsequent years. Basically, it was a consortium to make bids
to provide systems in the fifteen countries by 1991.110 Both
cases are important in that they analyse the market realistically
under Article 85(1), and interesting as they seem to indicate
that the Commission is more willing to accept joint sales than
it is to accept sales quotas or exclusive territories supported by
export bans."' Yet both kinds of provisions serve the same
function of protecting each venturer from over-exploitation by
the others, and joint distribution removes all possibility of
109. Officials must now be under pressure to draft their decisions as shortly as
possible to save the need for translations and space in the Official Journal.
110. The consortia to build the Channel tunnel were also cleared by decision.
Eurotunnel, O.J. L 311/36 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 419.
111. Compare supra note 73 and accompanying text, where I mention the possibility of the group exemption for R & D being extended to cover joint sales, but not
quotas.
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competition between the parties, while quotas can be drafted
to permit some.
B. ConcentrativeJoint Ventures
Ever since the Commission's memorandum of 1966 on
concentrations, it has occasionally held that a joint venture is
not forbidden by Article 85(1) where it amounts to a partial
concentration.' 12 The idea has reappeared in the Merger Regulation,"' which treats concentrative joint ventures as mergers. If they are large enough, they are subject to control under
the regulation, but if not, no implementing regulation applies." 4 They enjoy provisional validity under Article 85 but
are subject to the application of Article 86 in national courts.
They can be controlled under the Merger Regulation only if
they create or strengthen a dominant position and under Article 86, probably, only if they strengthen one. 1 5 The distinction between collaborative and concentrative joint ventures is
unclear in principle
and practice." 6 The Commission has tried
117
to explain it.

112. E.g. SHV/Chevron, O.J. L 38/14 (1975), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D68. The concept was narrowed in De Laval/Stork, O.J. L 215/11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. D69,
but reappeared in an informal decision, Montedison/Hercules (Himont), COMMiSSION SEVENTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

66 (1988).

See Venit, supra note 4, at 8-9, 15-21, 28-29, for a short history.

113. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art. 3(2), O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected
version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990).
114. Id. art. 21, O.J. L 257/13, at 15 (1990).
115. In its statement of objections in British American Tobacco Co. and R.J.
Reynolds Indus. Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R.
4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24 [hereinafter Philip Morris], the Commission is said to
have challenged under Article 86 a merger that strengthened the dominance of the
target company, not the bidder. Id. at 4489, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 27.
116. See generally Hawk, supra note 73 (describing theological distinction between
coliaborative and concentrative joint ventures).
117. See Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 395/1 (1989), on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, O.J. C 203/10, at 11,
15-36 (1990).
The positive criterion is that the joint venture should perform on a lasting basis
all the functions of an autonomous economic entity and not depend on its parents for
some of them.
The negative criterion is that the agreement should "not have as its object or
effect the co-ordination of the competitive behaviour" of parents inter se or between
one or more of them and the joint venture. Id. at 12,
20-30. The parents must
withdraw entirely from the field of the joint venture, and have no horizontal or vertical relationships with it.
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In Metaleurop SA,"I" two companies transferred all their interests in lead and zinc into a joint venture, 35 percent of
whose shares were owned by the public. The parents retained
sufficient control only to protect their investment. Both left
the lead and zinc markets entirely. The merger clearly was
concentrative. Shortly before the Merger Regulation came
into force, the Commission adopted a decision that did not
mention Article 85(1). It considered only that Article 86 was
not infringed.
It is not stated why Article 85 was ignored. The joint venture supplied about 20 percent of the zinc market and 29 percent of the lead market, more than enough to exceed the de
minimis rule as it was applied in the 1980s. A possible explanation is that the merger could have been controlled under article 2(c) and (d) of the Merger Regulation, had it been in force,
only if it had created or strengthened a dominant position as a
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or a substantial part of it.
Under this test, most concentrative joint ventures are cleared,
even if the firms' aggregate turnover be above the relevant
thresholds. It would be anomalous to apply the stricter test of
Article 85 so soon before the Merger Regulation came into
force. In the Commission's Twentieth Report on Competition Policy,119 the decision is classified as a merger rather than as a
joint venture.
C. GEC-Siemens/Plessey: Appreciable Effects
In GEC-Siemens/Plessey,' 20 the Commission adopted a new
method of clearing joint ventures by raising the thresholds below which it decides that any restrictions of competition are
not appreciable. It accepted that a joint bid by GEC and Sie118. OJ. L 179/41 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 222. The Commission did not
expressly address the question whether Article 85 might apply. It considered only
Article 86, presumably because it considered that the agreement transferring all the
parties' activities concerning lead and zinc to a joint organization was concentrative.
The joint venture was to carry on mining, R & D, purchase and sales and had independent managing bodies. 35 percent of the shares were held by the public, a
substantial blocking minority.
119. COMMISSION TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 91-92 (1991).
120. O.J. C 239/2 (1990). See generally Venit, supra note 4. This was a decision
dismissing a complaint by an unwilling target company. The file was closed by a comfort letter sent to the bidders. See also Hawk, supra note 73, at 328-29.
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mens for Plessey did not have the object or effect of restricting
competition appreciably in most of the markets involved. The
bidders intended to divide Plessey's assets between them,
some to be held and exploited jointly and others to be appropriated to a single parent. The joint venture for some assets
affected the structure of the market rather than enabling the
parties to collaborate on a new activity. Although the three
undertakings involved were competitors in some fields and potential competitors in others,' 2 ' most of the markets were sufficiently competitive for the Commission to conclude that any
restriction of competition was not appreciable.
In relation to Plessey's traffic control systems, which were
to go to Siemens, the Commission added that Siemens had no
appreciable sales in the United Kingdom and Plessey none in
Germany. At paragraph 23, the Commission states that the
market is becoming increasingly international. So, Siemens
and Plessey must have been capable of entering the other's geographic market, soon. The Commission stated, however, that
it is hard to enter national markets save through acquisitions. 2 It added that the buyers were largely monopsonistic
and powerful enough to protect themselves. There were many
other suppliers, most of them confined to a single Member
State.
The Commission did not refer to possible spill-over effects into other activities of Siemens and GEC, nor did it mention that the joint bid interfered with the market for corporate
control, as it had done in Irish Distillers.123 This is welcome. A
joint bid interferes with that market only if other firms would
value the target company less highly. This is likely to be the
case only where the acquisition by a competitor would increase
121. GEC-Siemens/Plessey, O.J. C 239/2, at 3, 15 (1990).
122. Contrast the Commission's first decision under stage two of the Merger
Regulation, Alcatel/Telettra, O.J. L 122/48, at 51-54,
23-49 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778, 784-89, where the Commission stressed the ability of firms not then
providing telephone equipment in Spain to enter that market, although the appropriate directive allowing for free movement does not come into force in Spain as soon as
it does elsewhere.
123. COMMISSION EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 85 (1989) explains that the Commission saw the bid for Irish Distillers as allocating markets. It
does not mention the market for corporate control, which figured at an earlier stage
of its proceedings. It may already have been playing down the effects on the market
for corporate control by the end of 1988, when writing the report.
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its market power. So, the possibility should not require separate analysis.
GEC and Plessey had been operating their telecommunications business through a joint venture, which was to be reorganised and owned as to 60 percent by GEC and 40 percent by
Siemens. Given the high barriers to entry and the size and importance of the firms on their respective national markets, and
Siemens's importance throughout the Common Market, the
Commission found that the joint bid did appreciably affect
competition between the target company and the acquirers
and trade between Member States in relation to public and
large private switching and transmission.' 24 Nevertheless, the
joint venture enabled massively expensive R & D to be amortised over a larger turnover, and was likely to promote technical progress. The buying power of customers would prevent
the geographic division of markets. So the joint venture mer25
ited exemption.
The proceedings were ended by a letter dismissing the
complaint and a comfort letter to the parties who had notified
the agreement to bid jointly. In the case of a bid which successfully went ahead, there is no need to ensure that the parties will be able to enforce their contract years later. It used to
be said that an exemption which must be limited in time was
not suitable to mergers or acquisitions. I am told that the comfort letter was not limited in time.
The Commission had never previously published a decision dismissing a complaint, and took a year to decide to do so.
It must be indicating that its decision marked a new departure.
The Commission is using the de minimis rule at far higher
124. GEC-Siemens/Plessey, O.J. C 239/2, at 3 (1990). The Commission did not
decide whether the agreement relating to integrated circuits had appreciable anticompetitive effects, since it also merited exemption if it had such effects on the
ground that it would enable the high cost of R & D to be amortised over a larger
turnover. Id. at 5. In relation to Article 85(1), the Commission observed that the
parties had relatively low market shares in a very competitive market and that their
activities were complementary. Id.
125. Id. at 6, 34. The Commission concluded that the acquisition would lead
to a "wider range of more technologically advanced products" more rapidly. Id. at 4,
23. No substantial strengthening of GEC and Siemens on their respective geographic markets is expected. Id. The economies of scale in R & D depended on some
24. Competition
close and irreversible bonds between the companies. Id. at 4,
would not be eliminated given the increasing internationalisation of the particular
markets. Id. at 4, 3.
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thresholds than previously, and reducing the difference in the
substantive law applicable to concentrative and collaborative
joint ventures. 126 The Commission considered the structural
*matters, such as the sophistication of buyers, potential competition from other Member States and the difficulty of entering
save through an acquisition. These are the kind of considerations relevant under the Merger Regulation, but being taken
into account when the parties are able to coordinate their activities through their joint holdings of parts of Plessey's business. Concentrative joint ventures will be prohibited only if
they create or strengthen a dominant position and the test for
collaborative ones seems to be approaching that. The decision
is important in the long term and not only as the Merger Regulation was about to come into force.
The new practice of treating the restriction as not appreciable in the absence of high aggregate market shares may enable the Commission to dispose favourably of many more cases
than formerly, because fewer formal decisions of exemption
will have to be adopted and translated into eight other languages for publication in the Official Journal. It enables the
Commission to avoid all its causes for concern, not just the
problem of actual or potential competition, but also the group
effects, foreclosure and ancillary restraints. Moreover, the latter may be exempted even when they are subject to Article
85(1).127

On the other hand, I am concerned that as national barriers are removed, oligopolies at the national level may be replaced by oligopolies at the Community level.' 28 In telecom126. It is not intended to explain this distinction, to which I refer infra part V.E,
as it is complex, unsatisfactory and more relevant to a discussion of the Merger Regulation than to an article on collaborative joint ventures. For a perceptive discussion
see Hawk, supra note 73, and Venit, supra note 4.
The agreement to make a joint bid for Plessey may have been a concentration as
to some markets and ajoint venture for others where Plessey's assets were to be held
jointly. In its Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission discusses the case
under the heading, "Mergers and Concentrations." COMMISSION NINETEENTH RE-

81 (1990).
127. On the basis of Nungesser (L.G.) KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission, Case
258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, it used to be arguable that an
ancillary restraint that went too far to be cleared under Article 85(1) could not even
* be exempted under Article 85(3).
I -128. There is concern that the substantive test of the Merger Regulation, cited
infra part VI, is whether the merger creates or strengthens a dominant position as a
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
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munications we have had very concentrated national markets,
and mergers and joint ventures are being held not to infringe
Article 85 when they bring together potential competitors
from different parts of the Common Market. We are not told
the market shares of the three firms either in the United Kingdom or in the Common Market as a whole.' 2 9 It is difficult to
know whether the Commission has been too laissez-faire.
In the draft notice on cooperative joint ventures,13 0 the
Commission repeats the market shares that it stated were relevant to agreements generally in its notice on minor agreements. It has not followed GEC-Siemens/Plessey in raising them.
This surprises me, and it should be remembered that the notice is only a draft circulated for comment.
It does state, however, that where market shares do not
exceed 10 percent where the collaboration extends to distribution, and 20 percent in other cases, it plans to send comfort
letters of the exempting kind. It is unfortunate that it does not
feel free to send comfort letters of a clearing type, which would
make it easier to enforce the ancillary restrictions.
The Commission now has three grounds it may give for
not interfering with joint ventures: first, it may state that the
inherent effect is not anticompetitive, and clear ancillary restraints as being necessary to make it viable, et cetera, as in Odin
or ECR Konsortium 900; second, it may invoke the test of apresult of which competition is significantly impeded. Unless the Court develops a
concept of joint dominance, or of individual dominance with market shares in the
twenties, provided that there are only a few other firms which are not competing
aggressively, there is danger of mergers leading to oligopoly that will not be subject
to control.
129. Without knowing the market shares, it will be difficult to advise clients
whether their agreements require notification and exemption.
The U.K. Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigated the probable effects of the same merger in the United Kingdom. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PLC: SIEMENS A.G. AND THE PLESSEY COMPANY PLC, A REPORT ON THE PROPOSED MERGERS, Cm. 676 (Apr. 1989). It stated at

paragraph 6.58 that

GPT [the joint venture between Plessey and GEC] supplies about 65 per
cent of public switching equipment in the United Kingdom, but about 90
per cent of digital (Systems X and System Y) equipment supplied to BT.
Siemens does not supply public switching equipment in the United Kingdom, but is among the largest world suppliers of public switching equip-

ment, and its EWSD system is installed, or ordered for installation, in 33
countries throughout the world.
130. Draft Notice, supra note 73, reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app.
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preciability used in GEC-Siemens/Plessey; or, third, if it considers
the joint venture is concentrative, it will not be subject to Artito the Merger Regulation or Article 86 in nacle 85, but only
3
tional courts. '
D. Recent Exemptions under Article 85(3)
There are some very recent decisions, formal or incomplete, in which the Commission has failed to clear joint ventures that seem to have had no restrictive effects on competition. I3 2 They show that the Commission's decision to clear the
131. The Commission may also propose remedies to bring an infringement
even of Article 85 to an end under Article 89 of the Treaty, and competent national
competition authorities may forbid or exempt agreements under Article 88, but these
sanctions are not very effective in the absence of compulsory powers to obtain information or of the ability to impose fines.
132. The joint venture to allocate the design of sophisticated electronic components to be used on satellites between Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, OJ.
L 32/19 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 208, was exempted and not cleared on January
12, 1990, some six months before Odin and Konsortium ECR 900. Even on the narrowest possible market definition, the aggregate shares of the parents did not exceed 20
percent of the market. The parties' resources in this field seem to have been too
small to enable them to compete for making the equipment in world markets. It is
difficult to see how the joint venture foreclosed any competition that was possible
without it. It may be argued that Odin represents a change in view since then. For a
more detailed discussion of Alcatel Espace, see Hawk, supra note 73, at 331-33.
Cekacan, OJ. L 299/64 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2099,
however, was exempted on October 15, 1990-two months after the clearing decisions. Contrary to earlier precedents, such as Mitchell Cotts, the Commission did not
analyze it as a joint venture, since one party was to hold most of the shares in the
joint subsidiary. For a more complete discussion of Cehacan, see Hawk, supra note 73,
at 333-34. KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITr, O.J. L 19/25 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2009 [hereinafter KSB], was exempted on December 12, 1990,
some four months after the decisions in Odin and Konsortium ECR 900. In both decisions, when considering Article 85(1), the Commission perceived the relationship of
the parties expost. In KSB, the conclusions under Article 85(1) contradict the findings
15-33 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) (1991]
under Article 85(3). Id. at 30-31,
1 CEC at 2016-22; see Hawk, supra note 73, at 335.
Screensport/EBU Members, O.J. L 63/32 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
[1991] 1 CEC 2092, is significant, because the Commission refused even to exempt a
joint venture on grounds, partly, of foreclosure. On the one side was a consortium of
members of the European Broadcasting Union, i.e., undertakings that transmitted
television programmes and that were entitled to use all the programmes on the
Eurovision link, and on the other side, Sky television, which transmitted by satellite.
It is not clear that without the.help of a firm transmitting by satellite, the individual
members of the EBU could have started a channel devoted only to sports programmes separately. Perhaps a competitor to Sky would have been encouraged to provide
a competing sports channel had fewer members of the EBU been tied to Sky. On the
other hand, neither of the firms transmitting by satellite would have had easy access
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agreements in GEC-Siemens/Plessey, Odin and Konsortium ECR
900 cannot be relied on when joint ventures are being negotiated in the future. The failure of the Commission to coordinate the policy affecting its published decisions has the unfortunate effect of increasing the risks of collaboration.1 3 3 It is
greatly hoped that the Commission will affirm its intention to
clear joint ventures that do not restrict any competition that
would have been possible without the joint venture.
4
E. The Commission's Draft Guidelines on Joint Ventures'1

Early in January 1992, the Commission sent to the ambassadors of Member States a discussion document and draft noto sports events throughout the Common Market. It might have been more realistic
to have exempted the agreement for a few years and enabled another firm transmitting by satellite to bid then for the members of EBU.
It is possible that the three last decisions had already been almost finalised
before a change in policy was accepted throughout DG IV, as indicated in the press
release that reported the Odin decision. In 1990, while the Merger Task Force was
being established, senior management in DG IV must have had little time to spare for
coordination. It is hoped that cases like these will not be exempted in the future, but
found not to infringe Article 85(1).
In Alupower-Chloride, OJ. C 152/3 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 739, the Commission will probably close its file on sending a comfort letter; we are not told
whether this will be of the clearing or "merits exemption" type.
In Ford/Volkswagen, O.J. C 182/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 798, however, the
Commission announced its intention to grant an exemption subject to conditions for
a joint venture to design and produce a multi-purpose vehicle, with the comfort of a
car, but the additional luggage space of a light van. Renault has a market share of 58
percent of this segment of the vehicle market. The segment is difficult to enter as
very substantial investment is required to design a vehicle and tool up. The minimum efficient scale is estimated to be 110,000 units a year, while total demand in the
EEC is not expected to exceed 350,000 units a year. The Commission stressed that
the market shares of the parties for cars or, possibly, for passenger cars, is 26 percent, but I cannot see why that is relevant, since it does not look as if there is room in
the market for both firms to enter independently of each other, in which case, this
agreement too should have been cleared.
In Fiat/Hitachi, O.J. C 206/3 (1991), the Commission stated that it intended to
exempt a joint venture agreement to make hydraulic excavators of a size used in road
construction, and hydraulic cylinders for use therein and for other purposes,
although Fiat was withdrawing entirely from the market, and the expected market
share of the joint venture was not likely to exceed 16 percent.
133. Contrast the uniformity of the views on' the analysis of joint ventures of
U.S. scholars as diverse as Robert Pitofsky, Phillip Areeda and Robert Bork. Antitrust
Issues for a New Administration, in THE CONFERENCE

BOARD, RESEARCH BULLETIN

No.

233, at 16-19 (Betty Bock ed., 1989).
134. I am grateful to the editors of the Fordham International Law Journal for
giving me a chance to add this section to the Article at the last minute before

publication.
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tice on the future treatment of cooperative joint ventures. 3 5 It
hopes to receive comments on these and to publish a notice as
to how it intends to deal with cooperative joint ventures.
It accepts that cooperative joint ventures are
governed by legal provisions which are less favourable than
those applicable to concentrative JVs:
-they tend to fall within the very broad scope of Article
85(1), which prohibits any appreciable restriction,
whereas concentrative JVs can be prohibited only if they
exceed the dominance threshold;
-they do not benefit from any block exemption since cooperation extending to distribution is excluded from the
field of application of Regulations (EEC) No 417/85 (specialization) and No 418/85 (R&D), while Regulations
(EEC) No 2349/84 (patent licences) and No 556/89
(know-how licences) do not apply to relationships between the parent companies and the JV where the parties
are competitors;
-individual exemptions-unlike a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market or a decision not to oppose a concentration, adopted under Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89-may be granted only for a limited period and can be withdrawn;
-the procedure applicable to cooperative JVs under Regulation No 17/62 is lengthy (two years on average),
whereas that applicable to concentrative JVs is much
quicker (one month in13 many
cases and no more than five
6
months in all others).
The Commission calls the situation "discriminatory." It
plans to do something about it, but not everything that I would
like to see done. Even if the notice be adopted in its present
form, it will bind no one except the Commission, although national courts asked to enforce a contract may take it into account.
The Commission does not propose consistently to perceive joint ventures, ex ante, from the time when each party
must be assured that it will be able to appropriate the benefit
of the joint venture to itself. Sometimes it looks expost. Conse135. See Draft Notice, supra note 73, reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app.
136. Discussion Paper on -the Future Treatment of Cooperative Joint Ventures,
IV/647/91-EN, at 1-2 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 1992).
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quently, it does not draw the distinction so cogently used by
Judge Taft 3 7 between naked restraints that are intended only
to blunt competition, and ancillary restraints that make viable
some legitimate transaction. The distinction it draws between
restraints inherent in the transaction is not spelled out, but
seems to differ somewhat.
1. Possible Extensions of Group Exemptions
It is considering amending the group exemptions for
specialisation and R & D to permit joint sales when the market
shares do not exceed 10 percent. This would enable the parties
to appropriate the benefit of their investment in such cases. It
is, however, not stated at what date the 10 percent would be
measured. If the test is applied as the parties increase their
market share, it would help only in the initial period. I hope it
is applied once and for all when the agreement is made. That
is the time when the parties have to decide whether to invest.
If a risky investment proves successful, that adds to the competition already in the market.
Moreover, I can see no reason why other ways of allocating the market are not to be treated equally favourably. They
are no more restrictive of competition than are joint sales and
may be less so.
The Commission is also considering the amendment of
the group exemptions for technology licensing to permit them
to apply to licences from each parent to the joint venture, even
when the parents are competitors.
2. In Relation to Individual Notifications
The Commission lists various kinds of joint ventures that
fall outside Article 85(1). It repeats the statement in its Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy that it will look realistically
before deciding that the parties are potential competitors. 13 s
It repeats the de minimis rules as stated in 1986. There is
no sign that the limit of appreciability was raised generally in
39
GEC-Siemens/Plessey.'
It proposes to impose voluntary self restraint and deal
137. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
138. COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 50-52 (1984).
139. O.J. C 239/2 (1990).
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with individual cooperative joint ventures within five months,
provided that the parties are content with an unpublished comfort letter. In some respects these may state that Article 85(1)
is not infringed. Such a letter is helpful when enforcing the
ancillary restraints, since a national court may take the Commission's view into account. A letter stating, however, that the
agreement merits exemption may imply that it does infringe
Article 85(1), and because a national court cannot grant an exemption, it may make it very difficult to enforce the ancillary
restraints. The distinction between clearing and "merits exemption" type comfort letters is very important. Unfortunately, the Commission defines the situations where competition is not restricted 40 not only by reference to whether the
parents compete with each other, but largely on the terms of
the nature of the restrictions.
A joint venture between competing firms is unlikely to be
caught by Article 85(1) if the joint venture performs all the
functions of the firm and can operate like an independent firm,
provided that the parents have abandoned the market as well
as neighbouring markets and those up- or down-stream. This
exception for "full function joint ventures" that are not depen4
dent on their parents for raw materials, R & D or marketing,'1 1
reflects the Merger Regulation and is an unfortunate example
of the Commission perceiving the situation ex post. Once the
parents have irreversibly left these markets, it may be that they
are unlikely to compete with their joint venture. Nevertheless,
the practical result is that where parties are contemplating a
joint venture they are strongly induced to leave the neighbouring markets. This must be even more anti-competitive than
the equity interest in the joint venture reducing the incentive
of the parents to compete with it.
The Commission is likely to close individual files by sending a letter stating that the agreement merits exemption when
the joint venture will create substantial new capacity or increase that of its parents, provided that if the joint venture extends to marketing, the market share does not exceed 10 per140. Draft Notice, supra note 73, § II(C)(2), reprintedin Hawk, supra note 73, app.
at 354-58.
141. Of course, such ajoint venture is dependent on its parents in the sense that
each will usually be able to veto important decisions on the board of the joint venture.
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cent or in other cases 20 percent. It states that within these
limits, the risk of creating entry barriers is not too great, in
which case, it is unfortunate that the comfort letters will not
state that Article 85(1) is not infringed, thereby making it easier to enforce the agreement.
The Commission deals with ancillary restraints in a way
reminiscent of the Court's judgment in Pronuptiade Paris GmbH
v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis.t4 2 Additional restrictions of conduct
directly related and necessary to the JV must be assessed
together with the JV itself and be treated, in the light of the
rules of competition, as ancillary restrictions if they remain
subordinate in importance to the main object of the JV. In
particular as concerns the necessity of the restriction, it is
proper not only to take account of its nature, but equally to
ensure that its duration and subject-matter, and geographical field of application, do not exceed what the creation and
operation of the JV reasonably requires.
If a JV does not per se fall within the scope of Article
85(1), then neither do any additional agreements which,
while they restrict competition, 1 43 are ancillary to the JV in
the manner described above.
Conversely, if a JV falls within the scope of Article
85(1), then so will any ancillary restrictions. The same exemption criteria will then apply to both, and no specific justification4 need be given as regards the ancillary restric14
tions.
I have difficulty in telling what restrictions are to be
treated as inherent in the joint venture. Where joint sales or
other means of allocating the market made possible by the
joint venture are necessary to induce the investment, why are
such provisions not considered inherent in the transaction and
appraised as part of the joint venture itself?
142. Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414.
143. See id. at 381,
14-15, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 442. The Commission still
seems to be unwilling to admit that restrictions of conduct needed to make viable a
transaction that may increase competition do not restrict it. It seems to be invoking
the German theory of inherent restrictions: in the case of legitimate transactions,
minor restrictions that are inherent in the transaction are not anti-competitive. The
problem is to foretell what transactions will be treated as legitimate. Agreements
likely to restrict production and raise prices clearly will not be treated as legitimate.
144. Draft Notice, supra note 73, reprinted in Hawk, supra note 73, app. at 362.
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, The Commission is also working on a draft notice concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86 in national courts,
in which it makes it clear that it does not intend to grant formal
decisions of exemption unless there is a matter of policy involved. Consequently, most files will be closed by comfort letters and it remains very important whether the Commission
analyses the need for ancillary restrictions under Article 85(1)
or (3).

3. Conclusion on the Draft Guidelines
The Commission has been expecting to issue guidelines
on joint ventures "this year" for over half a decade. The prospect now looks imminent.
Some progress had been made. Where market shares are
low, joint sales may be allowed and ancillary restraints will be
judged as part of the joint venture itself.
To a lawyer brought up on U.S. antitrust law, however, the
result seems muddled. The concept of ancillary restraint used
by the Commission is based on a concept of inherency which is
not spelled out and seems to differ from the U.S. idea of an
ancillary restraint that is necessary to make viable some kind of
collaboration which increases competition. I am not clear
whether the pro- and anti-competitive effects will have to be
balanced. Where neither party alone could have achieved the
task of the joint venture, there may well be nothing to balance.
Since the Commission does not intend to grant many individual decisions of exemption, it is very important that the
competitive appraisal should take place under Article 85(1) as
was done in Delimitis v. Henninger Brdu AG.' 45 I regret that
many notifications of a cooperative joint venture will be followed by a comfort letter stating that it merits exemption, or
merely that it is closing the file. Let us hope that the Commission can be persuaded to change its mind on this.
VI. CONCLUSION-THE CLEARANCE OFJOINT
VENTURES
In 1990, there were three major innovations enabling the
Commission to clear joint ventures of which it approves. In
145. Case C-234/89 (Eur. Ct. J. Feb. 28, 1991) (not yet reported).
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Odin and Konsortium ECR 900, it cleared joint ventures involving R & D by stating that the parties were not actual or potential competitors, that the ancillary restraints were necessary to
make the transaction viable, and that there was no restriction
of competition. If these precedents were followed consistently, parties could ensure that each is able to reap where he
has sown and provide the incentive to risky investments.
In GEC-Siemens/Plessey, the Commission suggested that in
the light of specified structural considerations any restrictions
of competition, even between competitors or potential competitors, were appreciable only where their shares of a national
market were very important. The Commission seemed to be
indicating that when a joint venture does not create substantial
market power within a Member State an agreement does not
infringe Article 85(1), and even when they have substantial
market power, the agreement may be exempted. The Commission is still not limiting Article 85(3) to agreements that
clearly restrict competition but that produce other benefits for
the economy. It implied that the joint bid increased competition in the long run.
The decision is more revolutionary than Odin and Konsortium ECR 900, and I am somewhat concerned that it may enable firms with market power at a national level to combine
with those from other Member States and create Common
Market oligopolies. I would like the Commission to articulate
in public the reasons why it did not see this as a danger. It
seems, however, as if the Commission may be having second
thoughts, since there is no mention of raising the threshholds
of appreciability in the draft notice of the Commission now circulating for comment.
Some joint ventures such as Metaleurop14 6 have been found
to be concentrative and treated as outside the prohibition of
Article 85(1). They may be subject to control under the
Merger Regulation, but Regulation No. 17 no longer applies to
such joint ventures, 14 7 so Article 85 can hardly be enforced
against such agreements, although national courts might apply
146. oJ. L 179/41 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 222; supra part V.B (discussing
regulation).
147. Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, supra note 4, OJ. L 257/13, at 15
(1990), prevents the implementing regulations from applying to concentrative joint
ventures even below the thresholds.
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Article 86 and national authorities may apply national law to
concentrations below Community thresholds. The test under
Article 2(c) and (d) of the Merger Regulation is whether the
joint venture creates or strengthens a dominant position as a
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or a substantial part of it.
Under this test, most concentrative joint ventures must be
cleared, whether the firms' aggregate turnover is above or below the relevant thresholds. The threshold of market power
necessary to infringe the regulation is far higher than under
Article 85(1).
The higher threshold of appreciable effects used in GECSiemens/Plessey and the decision not to apply Article 85(1) to
concentrative joint ventures enable the Commission to clear
more joint ventures, and it can save its resources by doing this
by comfort letter without taking a formal decision under Article 85(3) of the Treaty. It may have gone too far, however, and
left itself with no powers to prevent national oligopolies becoming Common Market oligopolies as the barriers to interstate trade in the public sector are reduced.
It is said that there is a battle currently raging between the
Legal Service, which wants to clear many joint ventures as
outside Article 85(1), and some officials in DG IV who are reluctant to abandon control and who apply the old doctrine that
any important restriction of conduct restricts competition. 48
Until it is resolved politically, it will be difficult to give clear
advice to clients as to whether their agreements require exemption. This leaves them uncertain as to the enforceability of
ancillary restrictions required to make investments worthwhile.
Competition presupposes markets, and markets presuppose exclusive rights and the performance of agreements to
transfer them. In a sinful world, this presupposes some
method of enforcing agreements. It is the nature of contracts
to restrict conduct. Consequently, many restrictions of conduct are necessary to enable competition to operate. It is vital
that these should not be treated as requiring exemption in
most cases.
My own hope is that more joint ventures should be cleared
148. Since this was written, it seems that DG IV has won the battle, at least for
the time being.
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on the reasoning used in Odin, but I am concerned that the
other two arguments may go too far.
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